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Abstract 
The current U.S. Social Security program redistributes resources from high wage workers to low 
wage workers and from two-earner couples to one-earner couples. The present paper extends a 
standard general-equilibrium overlapping-generations model with uninsurable wage shocks to 
analyze the effect of spousal and survivors benefits on the labor supply of married couples. The 
heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to the 2009 U.S. economy predicts that removing spousal 
and survivors benefits would increase female market work hours by 4.3-4.9% and total output by 
1.1-1.5% in the long run, depending on the government financing assumption. If the increased 
tax revenue due to higher economic activity after the policy change was redistributed in a lump-
sum manner, a phased-in cohort-by-cohort removal of these benefits would make all current and 
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errors. 1 Introduction
The current Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program of the U.S. Social Security
system redistributes resources from high wage workers to low wage workers and from two-earner
couples to one-earner couples. Due to computational difﬁculty, however, most previous literature
on the dynamic general-equilibrium analyses of Social Security does not explicitly consider the
redistribution between one-earner and two-earner households.1 The lack of spousal and survivors
beneﬁts in the model economy potentially underestimates the labor supply distortion of the OASI
payroll tax. In an economy with these beneﬁts, the secondary earners consider a larger portion
of their payroll tax payments to be labor income taxes rather than pension contributions, and the
after-tax wage elasticity of the secondary earners’ labor supply is in general much higher.
The present paper extends a standard dynamic general equilibrium overlapping-generations
(OLG) model with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets by implementing the joint
labor supply decision of married couples; calibrates the model to the 2009 U.S. economy with
spousal and survivors beneﬁts; and analyzes to what extent the current spousal and survivors ben-
eﬁts possibly distort the labor supply decision of married households and whether the government
can improve the social welfare without signiﬁcantly reducing the insurance aspect of the current
Social Security OASI program.
In the model economy, households are heterogeneous with respect to their marital status (mar-
ried, widowed, or widowered), age, wealth, husband’s market wage rate, wife’s market wage rate,
the husband’s average historical earnings, and the wife’s average historical earnings. In each pe-
riod, which is a year, a working-age household receives idiosyncratic market wage shocks (one for
the husband and another for the wife) and jointly chooses the optimal consumption, market work
hours, and end-of-period wealth to maximize their rest of the lifetime utility, taking factor prices
and government policy schedule as given.
The present paper ﬁrst constructs a baseline economy, which is on the balanced growth path,
1For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu, ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu, and Joines (1995), Kotlikoff, Smetters,
and Walliser (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), and Huggett and Para (2010).
2with the current OASI system with spousal and survivors beneﬁts, and it checks whether the model
economy matches the U.S. economy in terms of the shares of elderly women by type of OASI
beneﬁts—worker’s own beneﬁts, spousal beneﬁts, and survivors beneﬁts received by widows.
Then, it assumes a 40-year cohort-by-cohort gradual removal of spousal and survivors beneﬁts
and solves the model for a steady-state equilibrium and an equilibrium transition path under sev-
eral different government ﬁnancing assumptions. Regarding the OASI budget, the paper assumes
that it is separated from the rest of the government budget and that workers’ own beneﬁts are
increased proportionally by keeping the payroll tax rate at the same level.
The main ﬁndings of the present paper are as follows: By removing spousal and survivors
beneﬁts from the current OASI system, the market work hours of women would increase by 4.3-
4.9% in the long run, depending on the government ﬁnancing assumption: increasing government
consumption (waste), increasing lump-sum transfers, or cutting marginal income tax rates. The
market work hours of men would increase only by 0.0-0.4%. Total labor supply in efﬁciency units
would increase by 0.8-1.1% and total output (GDP) would also increase by 1.1-1.5% in the long
run. The macroeconomic effect would be largest if the government cut the marginal income tax
rates and smallest if it increased transfer spending instead to balance the budget.
If the increased tax revenue due to the policy change was redistributed to households by in-
creasing lump-sum transfers, the welfare effect of the policy change would be largest. Under this
ﬁnancing assumption, the phased-in removal of spousal and survivors beneﬁts would make all cur-
rent and future age cohorts on average better off. If the increased tax revenue was reimbursed by
cutting marginal income tax rates, however, young households at the time of policy change and
households in the near future would be worse off slightly. Age 21 newborn households would be
better off on average by 0.3-0.8% in the long run with the consumption equivalence measure.
To the best of my knowledge, few papers have analyzed the effect of spousal and survivors
beneﬁts on the labor supply of married households, as well as on the macro economy and social
welfare, by using a large-scale dynamic general equilibrium OLG model. Kaygusuz (2008) is
probablytheﬁrstandonlypaperthatconstructsaheterogeneous-agentdeterministicOLGmodelto
3explicitly analyze the effect of spousal beneﬁts. The present paper is different from Kaygusuz’s in
severalaspects: itassumesuninsurableidiosyncraticwageshocksinthemodeleconomy,2 analyzes
both spousal and survivors beneﬁts,3 and solves the model for an equilibrium transition path to
check if the removal of these beneﬁts are welfare improving even in the short run.
Hong and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) also construct a heterogeneous-agent OLG model of married and
single households to analyze the welfare effect of Social Security in the presence/absence of life
insurance and annuity markets. In their model, however, the household’s labor supply is inelastic,
the age-earning proﬁles of the workers are deterministic, and Social Security beneﬁts are uniform
and independent of the household’s earning histories.4 The contribution of the present paper is
showing how married couples react to a future Social Security beneﬁt schedule by choosing their
optimal labor supply as well as saving.
The present paper is also related to papers on female labor supply. Olivetti (2006) constructs a
lifecyclemodelofmarriedcouplesthatincludesthehomeproductionofchildcareandlearning-by-
doing type human capital accumulation, and she analyzes the importance of these on the increase
in women’s market work hours. Attanasio, Low, and S´ anchez-Marcos (2008) also construct a life
cycle model of female labor participation (male labor supply is assumed to be inelastic). They
explain the change in female labor supply by the declining cost of raising children and labor par-
ticipation. They assume the earnings of the husband and wife are subject to positively correlated
permanent shocks. In the present paper, the model assumes unitary households—perfectly altruis-
tic married couples—similar to the above papers. It abstracts from the home production and human
capital accumulation but focuses more on the household’s reaction to the current OASI policy.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 describes the heterogeneous-agent OLG
model with the joint decision-making of married couples, Section 3 shows the calibration of the
2If a husband and a wife are not certain about their future market wages, thus their own social security beneﬁts, a
possible labor supply distortion caused by the spousal and survivors beneﬁts will be attenuated especially when they
are young.
3According to the policy experiments in Section 4, the labor supply and macroeconomic effects of survivors
beneﬁts is much larger than that of spousal beneﬁts in the model economy.
4Their model assumes that a married couple receives 150% of the average male beneﬁt and that a widow receives
100% of the average male beneﬁt.
4baseline economy to the U.S. economy, Section 4 explains the effects of removing spousal and sur-
vivors beneﬁts in the long run and in equilibrium transition paths, Section 5 checks the robustness
of the model, and Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix shows the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and
the computational algorithm to solve the household optimization problem.
2 The Model Economy
The economy consists of a large number of overlapping-generations households, a perfectly
competitive representative ﬁrm with constant-returns-to-scale technology, and a government with
a commitment technology.
2.1 The Households
The households are heterogeneous with respect to the age, i = 1;:::;I, beginning-of-period
household wealth, a 2 A = [0;amax], the husband’s average historical earnings, b1 2 B =
[0;bmax], the wife’s average historical earnings, b2 2 B, the husband’s earning ability, e1 2 E =
[0;emax], the wife’s earning ability, e2 2 E, and the marital status m: the husband and wife are
both alive (m = 0), the husband is alive but the wife is deceased (m = 1), and the husband is
deceased but the wife is alive (m = 2).
The model age i = 1 corresponds to the real age of 21. For simplicity, the husband and the
wife are the same age in the model economy, and they are married when they enter the economy at
age i = 1 and never get divorced. The average historical earnings are used for the average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME) and determine the primary insurance amounts (PIA) of Social Security
pension. The earning abilities of the husband and wife follow the ﬁrst-order Markov process, and
are independent of each other and of the mortality shocks.
Ineachyear, t, ahouseholdreceivesearningabilityshocks, e1 ande2, andchoosesconsumption
spending, c, the husband’s hours of market work, h1, the wife’s hours of market work, h2, and end-
of-period wealth, a0, to maximize their expected lifetime utility. The PIA of a married couple is
5calculated separately for the husband and the wife. For a married elderly household (m = 0),
the secondary earner receives either her own old-age beneﬁt or the spousal beneﬁt (50% of her
spouse’s old-age beneﬁt), whichever is higher. For a widow(er)ed elderly household (m = 1 or 2),
the survivor receives either her own old-age beneﬁt or the survivors beneﬁt (100% of her spouse’s
old-age beneﬁt), whichever is higher.
State Variables. Let s and St be the individual state of a household and the aggregate state of
the economy in year t, respectively,
s = (i;a;b1;b2;e1;e2;m); St = (x(s);WG;t);
where x(s) is the population density function of households and WG;t is the government net wealth






where CG;t is government consumption, trLS;t is a lump sum transfer that includes accidental
bequests to each person, I;t() is a progressive income tax function, P;t() is a Social Security
payroll tax function, trSS;t() is a Social Security beneﬁt function, and WG;t+1 is government net
wealth at the beginning of the next year.
TheOptimizationProblem. Letv(s;St;	t)bethevaluefunctionofaheterogeneoushousehold


















6subject to the constraints for the decision variables,
c > 0; (2)
0  h1 < 1 if m 6= 2; h1 = 0 if m = 2; (3)
0  h2 < 1 if m 6= 1; h2 = 0 if m = 1; (4)
and the law of motion of the individual state,
s
















(1 + rt)a + wte1h1 + wte2h2   I;t(rta + wte1h1 + wte2h2;m) (6)









(i   1)b1 + min(wte1h1;#max)








(i   1)b2 + min(wte2h2;#max)

+ 1fiIR or m=1gb2; (8)
where u() is the period utility function, ~  is the growth-adjusted time discount factor, m;i is the
joint survival probability (the probability that at least one family member survives) at the end of
age i, i(e0
1;e0
2;m0je1;e2;m) is the transition probability function of exogenous state variables, 
is the long-run productivity growth rate, rt is the interest rate, wt is the wage rate per efﬁciency
unit of labor, and 1fg is an indicator function that returns 1 if the condition in f g holds and
0 otherwise. The present paper does not explicitly model home production to avoid additional
complexity, but the model considers the cost of reduced home production when women (wives)
work outside the home. In the budget constraint, equation (6), wth2 shows an extra cost for
women to work outside the home, e.g., the cost of daycare services and the additional expense of
dining outs. For simplicity, the productivity at home is assumed to be equal for all women. In
the law of motion of b1 and b2, #max are the maximum taxable earnings for the OASI program.
To describe a balanced growth path by a steady-state equilibrium, individual variables other than
working hours are normalized by using the long-run growth rate, 1 + .
7Preference. The household’s period utility function depends on the marital status. The utility
functions of a widower (m = 1) and a widow (m = 2) are a combination of Cobb-Douglas and
constant relative risk aversion,




for j = 1;2;
and the utility function of a married couple (m = 0) has the following additively separable form,









where 1    2 [0;1] is the degree of joint consumption. For example, all of the household con-
sumption, c, is consumed jointly when  = 0, and all is consumed separately when  = 1.5 With
this speciﬁcation, the growth-adjusted time discount factor is calculated as ~  = (1 + )(1 )
when  is the unadjusted time discount factor.
The State Transition Function. The model assumes that the husband’s working ability and the
wife’s working ability are independent of each other and of the mortality of their spouses. It
also assumes that the deaths of the husband and wife are independent of each other. Then, the












where e1;i() and e2;i() are transition probability functions of working ability, and
pm;i(0j0) = 1;i2;i; pm;i(1j0) = 1;i(1   2;i); pm;i(2j0) = (1   1;i)2;i;
5The share of joint consumption in total household consumption is calculated as (1   ) =(1 + ) . In a gen-
eral setting, the utility functions of a husband and wife can be deﬁned separately, u1( c1;c2;h1;h2) = ~ u1( c1;h1) +
'~u2( c2;h2) and u2( c2;c1;h2;h1) = ~ u2( c2;h2) + '~u1( c1;h1) , where '  1 is the degree of altruism. The
present paper assumes that a married couple is perfectly altruistic, ' = 1 , and that their consumption is equal,
c1 = c2 = c=(1 + ) . Then, we get the unitary utility function of a married couple described above. Kotlikoff
and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) discuss the utility function of a married couple with inelastic labor
supply.
8pm;i(0j1) = 0; pm;i(1j1) = 1;i; pm;i(2j1) = 0;
pm;i(0j2) = 0; pm;i(1j2) = 0; pm;i(2j2) = 2;i:
The Income Tax Function. Let y be the taxable income of a household, and let dm be the sum
of deductions and exemptions of the household with marital status m, then,
y = max(rta + wte1h1 + wte2h2   dm;0);










where the parameters (progressive tax rates) depend on the marital status: m = 0 (married ﬁling
jointly) or m = 1;2 (single).
Social Security Pensions. Let y1 = wte1h1 and y2 = wte2h2 be the earnings of the husband and
the wife, and let #max be the maximum taxable earnings for the OASI program. Then the OASI
payroll tax function is





where  P;t is a ﬂat OASI tax rate that includes the employer portion of the tax. Let #1 and #2 be
the thresholds for the 3 replacement rate brackets, 90%, 32%, and 15%, that calculate the primary
insurance amount (PIA) from the average historical earnings. Then, the PIA’s of the husband and
the wife,  (i;b1) and  (i;b2), are
 (i;bj) = 1fiIRg(1 + )
40 i
0:90min(bj;#1)
+ 0:32max[min(bj;#2)   #1;0] + 0:15max(bj   #2;0)
	
for j = 1;2;







 (i;b1) +  (i;b2);1:5 (i;b1);1:5 (i;b2)






if m = 1;2;
where  t is an OASI beneﬁt adjustment factor. The adjustment factor is set at 1.0 in a baseline
economy. When both the husband and the wife are alive (m = 0), the OASI beneﬁt is 1:5 (i;b1) if
 (i;b2)<0:5 (i;b1), it is 1:5 (i;b2) if  (i;b1)<0:5 (i;b2), and it is  (i;b1)+ (i;b2) otherwise.
When one of those is deceased (m = 1;2), the OASI beneﬁt is either  (i;b1) or  (i;b2), whichever
is the larger one.
Decision Rules. Solving the household’s problem for c, h1, and h2 for all possible states, we
obtain the household’s decision rules, c(s;St;	t), h1(s;St;	t), and h2(s;St;	t).6 The other






(1 + rt)a + wte1h1(s;St;	t) + wte2h2(s;St;	t)
  I;t(rta + wte1h1(s;St;	t) + wte2h2(s;St;	t);m)
  P;t(wte1h1(s;St;	t);wte2h2(s;St;	t)) + trSS;t(i;b1;b2;m)




















+ 1fiIR or m=1gb2:
The Distribution of Households. Let xt(s) be the growth-adjusted population density of house-
holds in period t, and let Xt(s) be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. We assume
that households enter the economy as a married couple with no assets and working histories, i.e.,
a = b1 = b2 = m = 0, and that the growth-adjusted population of age i = 1 households is
6We discretize the individual state space and solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the household problem for each
state by using a Newton-type nonlinear equation solver (a modiﬁed Powell hybrid algorithm). See Appendix for the

































2;m0je1;e2;m) is the transition probability density function of exogenous state vari-
ables.
Aggregation. The growth-adjusted private wealth, WP;t; capital stock (national wealth), Kt, in a

















(e1 h1(s;St;	t) + e2 h2(s;St;	t)) dXt(s):
2.2 The Firm
In each period, the representative ﬁrm chooses the capital input, ~ Kt, and efﬁciency labor input,
~ Lt, to maximize its proﬁt, taking factor prices, rt and wt, as given, i.e.,
(9) max
~ Kt;~ Lt
F( ~ Kt; ~ Lt)   (rt + ) ~ Kt   wt~ Lt;
11where F() is a constant-returns-to-scale production function,





with total factor productivity A, and  is the depreciation rate of capital. The proﬁt maximizing
conditions are
(10) FK( ~ Kt; ~ Lt) = rt + ; FL( ~ Kt; ~ Lt) = wt;
and the factor markets clear when Kt = ~ Kt and Lt = ~ Lt.
2.3 The Government
Inthemodeleconomy, thepayrolltaxrateisﬁxedatthesamelevelandthebeneﬁtsareadjusted
proportionately so that the social security budget is always balanced.7 The government’s OASI
payroll tax revenue, TP;t, is








and the OASI beneﬁt expenditure, TRSS;t, is








In the baseline economy, the parameter,  t, of the beneﬁt function set at 1.0 and the OASI residual
is calculated as TRO = TP;t( P;t) TRSS;t( t). The OASI residual includes the OASI beneﬁts not
considered in this model economy and administrative costs. In the policy experiments below,  P;t
and TRO are kept at the baseline levels, and the beneﬁt parameter,  t, is adjusted so that the OASI
budget is balanced, i.e., TRSS;t( t) = TP;t( P;t)   TRO.
7If a policy change increases the labor income of working-age households, other things being equal, elderly
households will also be better off through the increased social security beneﬁt under this assumption.

















(1 + 1fm=0g)trLS;t dXt(s):
Thegovernmentcollectsaccidentalbequests—remainingwealthheldbydeceasedhouseholds—
at the end of period t and distributes it in a lump-sum manner in the same period.8 The revenue








(1   m;i)(1 + )a
0(s;St;	t)dXt(s);
where the survival rate of married couple (m = 0) is calculated as 0;i = 1   (1   1;i)(1   2;i).












The law of motion of the government net wealth is
(17) WG;t+1 =
1
(1 + )(1 + )

(1 + rt)WG;t + TI;t('t) + BQt   CG;t   TRLS;t(trLS;t)

:
Note that aggregate variables are normalized by both the long-run productivity growth rate, 1+ ,
and the population growth rate, 1+, so that the balanced growth path of the economy is obtained
as a steady state equilibrium.
8Since there are no aggregate shocks in the model economy, the government can perfectly predict the sum of
accidental bequests during the period.
132.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium of this model economy is deﬁned as follows.
DEFINITION Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: Let s = (i;a;b1;b2;e1;e2;m) be the indi-
vidual state of households, let St = (x(s);WG;t) be the state of the economy, and let 	t be the










rs;ws;CG;s;trLS;s;'s;  P;s; s;WG;s
	1
s=t;
where 't is a parameter of the individual income tax function,  P;t is a parameter of the payroll
tax function, and  t is a parameter of the Social Security beneﬁt function; the value functions of
households, fv(s;Ss;	s)g1










and the distribution of households, fxs(s)g1
s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, for all
s = t;:::;1, each household solves the optimization problem (1)-(8), taking Ss and 	s as given;
the ﬁrm solves its proﬁt maximization problem (9)-(10); the government policy schedule satisﬁes
(11)-(17); and the goods and factor markets clear. The economy is in a steady-state equilibrium
thus on a balanced growth path if, in addition, Ss = Ss+1 and 	s+1 = 	s for all s = t;:::;1.
143 Calibration
Thepresentpaperassumesonemainbaselineeconomyandthreealternativebaselineeconomies
to check the robustness of the policy implications. In the alternative economies, the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion, , is reduced from 4.0 to 2.0; the auto-correlation parameter of the market
wage process, , is lowered from 0.98 to 0.96; and the market wage correlation between a husband
and a wife at age 21 is increased from 0.5 to 1.0 independently.
For simplicity, the baseline economies are all assumed to be in a steady-state equilibrium, thus
on a balanced-growth path, with the current-law OASI system with spousal and survivors beneﬁts.
In the baseline economies, the discount factor, , is chosen so that the capital-output ratio, K=Y ,
is equal to 2.5; the additional cost parameter of female market work, , is chosen by targeting the
ratio of average working hours of women to men,  h2= h1, to be 0.75; and government consumption,
CG, and the OASI residual, TRO, are set to balance the government budget and social security
budget, respectively.
Table 1 shows the parameters and policy variables common in all of the baseline economies,
and Table 2 shows the parameters and variables that vary by baseline assumptions.
3.1 Demographics
The maximum possible age, I, in the model economy is assumed to be i = 80, which corre-
sponds to real age 100. This setting will cover more than 99% of the adult population in the United
States. The retirement age, IR, is ﬁxed at i = 46 (real age 66). This is the current full retirement
age for workers born in 1943-54 (Social Security Administration, 2010). The labor-augmenting
productivity growth rate, , is 1.8% and the population growth rate, , is 1.0% in the model econ-
omy. These numbers are consistent with U.S. historical data. The survival rates of men and women
at the end of each age, 1;i and 2;i, are calculated from Table 4.C6 2005 Period Life Table in So-
cial Security Administration (2010). The survival rates at the end of age 100 (i = 80) are replaced
with zeros. For simplicity, the model abstracts from possible divorces and remarrying. Thus, the
15Table 1: Parameters and Baseline Policy Variables Independent of Model Assumptions
Maximum possible age I 80 Real age 100
Retirement age IR 46 Full retirement age 66
Productivity growth rate  0.018
Population growth rate  0.010
Share parameter of consumption  0.36 Cooley et al. (1995)
Adjustment parameter of consumption  0.60 Bernheim et al. (2008)
Share parameter of capital stock  0.30
Depreciation rate of capital stock  0:070 r = 0:050 in the baseline
Total factor productivity A 0.9751 w = 1:0 in the baseline
Average median wage: men aged 21-65  e1 1.0 weh1  0:36  $44;200 in 20091
Income tax parameters: tax rate limit 't 0.30 Statutory rate 0.35 in 2009
married (m = 0) : curvature 'm;1 0.9601 o
Estimated by OLS : scale 'm;2 1.0626
: deduction/exemptions dm 0.1523 2  $3;650 + $11;400 in 2009
single (m = 1;2): curvature 'm;1 0.7494 o
Estimated by OLS : scale 'm;2 1.2144
: deduction/exemptions dm 0.0762 $3;650 + $5;700 in 2009
Social Security payroll tax rate  P;t 0.106 OASI tax rate 0:053  2
Maximum taxable earnings #max 0.8699 $106,800 in 2009
Replacement rate threshold: 0.90 & 0.32 #1 0.0727 $74412 = $8;928 in 2009
: 0.32 & 0.15 #2 0.4382 $4,48312 = $53;796 in 2009
Government net wealth WG;t 0.0
OASI beneﬁt adjustment factor  t 1.0
1 The population average of the estimated median earnings of full-time male workers by age. A unit in the
model economy thus corresponds to $122,778 in 2009.











3.2 Preference and Technology Parameters
The share parameter of consumption in the utility function, , is set at 0.36, following the
real business cycle (RBC) literature (for example, Cooley and Prescott, 1995). The coefﬁcient of

















Coeff. of relative risk aversion  4.0 2.0 4.0 4.0
Auto corr. parameter of log wage  0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98
Standard dev. of wage shocks  0.17 0.17 0.2392 0.17
Wage corr. of couples at age 21 corr(e11;e21) 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0
Discount factor1  1.0087 0.9910 0.9971 1.0100
Growth-adjusted discount factor2 ~  0.9894 0.9846 0.9781 0.9908
Cost par. of female market work3  0.0845 0.0274 0.0844 0.0820
Government consumption CG;t 4.8969 5.2445 5.3039 4.9680
Lump-sum transfers (bequests) trLS;t 0.0089 0.0077 0.0082 0.0091
OASI residual TRO 0.4859 0.4303 0.4521 0.5377
1 The capital-output ratio, K=Y , is targeted to 2 :5 . 2 Calculated with ~ = (1+ ) (1 ). 3 The relative
working hours of women to men, h2=h1, is targeted to 0.75.
relative risk aversion, , is 4.0 in the main baseline economy, following Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), and it is later reduced to 2.0 in an alternative base-
line economy (Run 2). With these parameter values, the elasticity of substitution of the husband’s
market work hours for the wife’s hours is approximately  1 

1
(1 )(1 ) 1 = 0:61. The consump-
tion adjustment factor for a married couple,  is assumed to be 0.6, following Bernheim, Forni,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2003).9
The share parameter of capital stock in the production function, , is set at 3.0, which is close
to the recent U.S. data. The depreciation rate of capital stock, , is 7.0% so that the interest rate,
r, is equal to 5.0% in the baseline economies when the capital-output ratio is targeted to 2.5. Total
factor productivity, A, is 0.9751 so that the average wage rate, w, is normalized to unity in the
baseline economies. The population-weighted average of the median male wage rate, w e1, for
ages 21-65 is also normalized to unity.
According to Table 5 of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010), the average working hours of
9Attanasio, Low, and S´ anchez-Marcos (2008) use the parameter value corresponding to  = 0 :67 . The difference
between 0.6 and 0.67 is almost negligible in the policy experiments.
17female workers is calculated as 36.3 per week in 2009, and is 89.7% of that for male workers. The
labor participation rate of women of ages between 25 and 54 is 75.8% in 2008 , which is 83.8% of
the labor participation rate of men. Thus, the ratio of women’s market work hours to men’s market
work hours is approximately calculated as 89.7%83.8%=75.2%. Under the wage assumptions of
men and women described in the next section, the model cannot replicate the lower working hours
of women relative to men without introducing either the ﬁnancial or utility cost for women to work
outside the home and reduce their home production. The cost parameter of female market work is
chosen so that the market work hour ratio,  h2= h1, is equal to 0.75 in the baseline economies.
3.3 Market Wage Processes
The individual market wage rate (working ability), e1;i and e2;i, of age i in the model economy
is assumed to be
lnej;i = ln  ej;i + lnzj;i
for i = 1;:::;IR   1 and j = 1;2, where  ej;i is the median wage rate of men or women at age i,
and the persistent shock, zj;i, is assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
lnzj;i = lnzj;i 1 + j;i;
where j;i  N(0;2) and lnzj;1  N(0;0:52=(1   2)). The median market wage rates of men
and women,  e1;i and  e2;i, for ages between 21 and 65 are constructed with the 2009 median usual
weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers by age and sex in the Current Population
Survey (Table 1 in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010).
The median earnings of full-time workers would probably overestimate the working ability
(the wage rate) of median workers, because some workers cannot choose a full-time job due to
schooling or poor health conditions. The median earnings of all workers would underestimate the


























Men (2009) Men (est.) Women (2009) Women (est.)
Figure 1: The Earnings Proﬁle of Men and Women (Median usual weekly earnings of full-time
wage and salary workers, 2009)
the present paper uses the former by adjusting the median earnings of full-time workers aged 24
or younger and aged 60 or older by 10% for schooling and deteriorated health conditions. Then
it interpolates the median earnings proﬁles by OLS for ages 21-70. Figure 1 shows the original
data and estimated values. When the full-time working hours in the model economy is  = 0:36,
the median earnings of male full-time workers is 0.36 in the baseline economy, and this number
corresponds to the average of the median earnings of male full-time workers, $44;200 = $85052,
calculated from Table 1 in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).
The autocorrelation parameter, , is assumed to be 0.98 and the standard deviation, , of the
transitory shock is set at 0.17 in the main baseline economy; and these parameters are changed to
 = 0:96 and  = 0:2392 in the alternative baseline economy (Run 3).10 The log persistent shock,
lnzj;i, is ﬁrst discretized into 11 levels each by using Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes, then 5 lev-
els of lnzj;i are generated by combining 4 nodes in each tail distribution into one node.11 The un-
conditionalprobabilitydistributionofthe5nodesisj;i = (0:0731;0:2422;0:3694;0:2422;0:0731)
for i = 1;:::;IR   1 and j = 1;2. The tail nodes are combined because matching the tail dis-
10The standard deviation in the alternative economy is chosen so that lim i!1 (ln zj;i) = =
p
1   2 = 0 :8543 ,
which is equal to that in the main baseline economy.
11See, for example, Judd (1998) for general calculation of Gauss-Hermite quadrature.




1;i)] and e2;i = [(ek
2;i+1 je
j
2;i)] for i = 1;:::;IR   1, that corresponds to
 = 0:98 is calculated by using the bivariate normal distribution function as
e1;i = e2;i =
0
B B B B B
B
@
0:9585 0:0415 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
0:0125 0:9554 0:0321 0:0000 0:0000
0:0000 0:0210 0:9580 0:0210 0:0000
0:0000 0:0000 0:0321 0:9554 0:0125
0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0415 0:9585
1




and the transition matrix corresponding to  = 0:96 is
e1;i = e2;i =
0
B B B B
B B
@
0:9184 0:0816 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
0:0246 0:9123 0:0631 0:0000 0:0000
0:0000 0:0414 0:9173 0:0414 0:0000
0:0000 0:0000 0:0631 0:9123 0:0246
0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0816 0:9184
1




3.4 Government’s Policy Functions
The parameters of the Gouveia-Strauss type individual income tax function are estimated by
OLS with the statutory marginal tax rates in 2009. One of the parameters, 't, is the limit of the
marginal tax rate as taxable income goes to inﬁnity. Thus, 't is ﬁrst set at 0.35, the highest tax
rate in 2009, in the baseline economy. The other two parameters, 'm;1 and 'm;2, are estimated
by OLS (equally weighted for taxable income between $0 and $500,000), separately for married
households ﬁling jointly and single households. Then, 't is reduced to 0.30 from 0.35 to reﬂect
the lower effective income tax rates. Individual income tax revenue, TI;t, is calculated as 11.4%
of GDP in the main baseline economy. The baseline economy assumes CG;t = TI;t and TRLS;t =
WG;t = 0 so that the government budget is balanced. Figure 2 shows the statutory and estimated
marginal income tax rates when 't = 0:35.
The OASI payroll tax rate is 5.3% for an employee and 5.3% for an employer. Thus,  P;t
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Figure 2: The Marginal Income Tax Rate Schedule of Married and Single Households
the age cohorts when they reach age 62 in the U.S. system. For simplicity, the growth-adjusted
thresholds for all age cohorts are ﬁxed in the model economy, and the PIA of each age cohort is
adjusted later by using the long-term productivity growth rate and years from age 60. Thus, the
model simply uses the thresholds for the age 62 cohort in 2009 after scale adjustment. The OASDI
beneﬁt adjustment factor,  t, is 1.0 in the baseline economy. To balance the OASI budget, we
also set the OASI residual, TRO, at 0.4859, which is 18.7% of the OASI payroll tax revenue in the
baseline economy. In 2008, the OASI beneﬁt payments are 88.6% of the corresponding payroll
tax revenue (Social Security Administration, 2010). The residual in the model economy is larger
partly because the model assumes the full retirement age is 66 while it is between 65 and 66 for the
current recipients in the U.S. economy. The residual also consists of survivors beneﬁts received by
workers’ children and parents that are not considered in the present paper.
3.5 The Property of the Baseline Economy
Table 3 summarizes the shares of elderly women by type of beneﬁt in the 2008 data and in
the model economies.12 The ﬁrst row of the table shows that 44.2% of women aged 62 or older
receive their own workers beneﬁts, 22.3% receive spousal beneﬁts, and 33.4% receive survivors
12Karen Kopecky and Tatyana Koreshkova suggested the author to check the distribution of female recipients by
type of beneﬁt in the data (Table 5.A14 in Social Security Administration, 2010).







Data (2008)1 44.2 22.3 33.4 Social Security Administration (2010)
Run 1 56.4 16.8 26.8 Main baseline economy
Run 2 54.3 19.2 26.4 Lower risk aversion
Run 3 57.3 16.4 26.3 Lower wage persistence
Run 4 57.7 14.7 27.6 Higher wage correlation
Run 10 44.9 23.5 31.6 Main baseline with  h2= h1 = 0:60
1 Women aged 62 or older. Author’s calculation from Table 5.A14 in Social Security Administration
(2010).
beneﬁts in 2008. The second row (Run 1) shows that the corresponding shares of elderly women
are 56.4%, 16.8%, and 26.8% in the main baseline economy. The share of women that receive
their own worker’s beneﬁts is 12.2 percentage points higher. The share of worker’s beneﬁts is also
higher in the three alternative baseline economics (Runs 2-4).
The model in the present paper, calibrated to the 2009 U.S. economy does not replicate the
shares of elderly women by type of beneﬁts in 2008, because the baseline economy is assumed to
beinasteady-stateequilibrium(oronthebalancedgrowthpath)andthethewagerateandthelabor
participation rate of current elderly women observed in the data are much lower when they are in
the prime working years. The median earnings of full-time female workers aged 21-65 relative to
that of male workers (estimated by OLS) is on average 79.6% in 2009, while the corresponding
relative median earnings aged 16 and over is 64.0% in 1980, which is about 20% lower than that
in 2009. The labor participation of women aged 25-54 relative to that of men is 83.8% in 2009,
as discussed in the previous section. In 1975, 1980, and 1985, the corresponding numbers are
58.4%, 67.9%, and 74.1%, respectively, and these are also on average 20% lower than that in 2009
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). The last row (Run 10) of the table shows the shares of elderly
women by type of beneﬁt are very close to those in the 2008 data when the main baseline economy
is recalibrated by assuming the female market wage rates, e2;i, are 20% lower and by targeting the
ratio of average working hours,  h2= h1 to be 0.60 instead of 0.75.
224 Removing Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts
Policy experiments of the present paper are simple. The economy is assumed to be in the initial
steady-state equilibrium (or on the balanced growth path) in period 0. Starting at the beginning of
period 1, the government removes the spousal and survivors beneﬁts of the current OASI program
cohort by cohort in a phased in manner. More speciﬁcally, for households aged 61 (i=41) or older
in period 1, their OASI beneﬁt function is unchanged, because it is too late for these households to












 (i;b1) +  (i;b2);1:5 (i;b1);1:5 (i;b2)

if m = 0;






if m = 1;2;
where  0 and  T are beneﬁt adjustment parameters in the initial and ﬁnal steady states, respec-
tively, and  t is adjusted to balance the OASI budget in each transition period. For households
aged 21 (i=1) or younger, their OASI beneﬁt function is fully replaced by the new beneﬁt func-









 (i;b1) +  (i;b2)

if m = 0;
 t  (i;bj) if m = j = 1;2:
Finally, for households aged between 22 (i=2) and 60 (i=40), their possible spousal and survivors
beneﬁts are reduced cohort by cohort. The OASI beneﬁt function is set to be the weighted average















Government’s Financing Assumptions. Any changes in the current Social Security system
would change the government’s income and payroll tax revenue. If spousal and survivors ben-
23eﬁts were eliminated, the government’s beneﬁt expenditure would decline, and the payroll tax
revenue would likely increase due to larger labor supply, other things being equal. For simplicity,
the OASI budget is balanced in each period in the model economy, the payroll tax rate,  P;t, is ﬁxed
at the baseline level, and the beneﬁts are changed proportionally in each period by the adjustment
factor,  t, to match the payroll tax revenue. For the rest of the government budget, the removal
of the spousal and survivors beneﬁts would likely increase labor supply, thus increasing individual
income tax revenue. The rest of the government budget is also balanced in each period, and either
government consumption, CG;t, lump-sum transfer, trLS;t, or marginal income tax rate parameter
't, is changed in each period to balance the budget.
The government’s ﬁnancing rules assumed in this paper are summarized as follows:
(a) CG;t    CG;t = TI;t('0)   TRLS;t(trLS;0); WG;t = 0;
(b) trLS;t    TRLS;t(trLS;t) = TI;t('0)   CG;0; WG;t = 0;
(c) 't    TI;t('t) = CG;0 + TRLS;t(trLS;0); WG;t = 0;
(a) - (c)  t    TRSS;t( t) = TP;t( P;0)   TRO:
Welfare Measure. The welfare gains or losses of age 21 (i = 1) households at the beginning
of t = 1;:::;1 are calculated by the uniform percent changes, 1;t, in the baseline consumption
path that would make their expected lifetime utility equivalent with the expected utility after the










Similarly, the average welfare changes of households of age i at the time of policy change (t = 1)
are calculated by the uniform percent changes, i;1, required in the baseline consumption path so











Note that i;1 for i = I;:::;1 shows the cohort-average welfare changes of all current households
alive at the time of policy change, and 1;t for t = 2;:::;1 shows the cohort-average welfare
changes of all future households.
4.1 Long-Run Effects on Macro Economy and Welfare
Table4showsthelong-runeffectsofremovingspousalandsurvivorsbeneﬁtsunderthegovern-
ment ﬁnancing assumptions of (a) increasing government consumption, (b) introducing lump-sum
transfers, and (c) decreasing marginal income tax rates.
In Run 1(a), the government is assumed to increase its consumption to balance the budget. By
removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts, women’s market work hours would increase by 4.6% and
labor supply in efﬁciency units would increase by 2.2% from the baseline economy. The increase
in the latter is smaller because women with lower wages would increase market work hours more
than those with higher wages. Men’s market work hours would increase only by 0.3%, and labor
supply would increase by 0.1%. The ratio of women’s market work hours to men’s work hours
would rise by 3.3 percentage points from 75.0% to 78.3%, and the ratio of women’s labor supply
to men’s labor supply would rise by 1.4 percentage points from 67.4% to 68.8%.
Total labor supply in efﬁciency units would increase by 0.9%, and capital stock (national
wealth) and total output (GDP) would increase by 1.9% and 1.2%, respectively. The OASI payroll
tax revenue would increase by 1.2%. The increase rate would be higher than that of total labor sup-
ply, because those whose labor income are below the maximum taxable earnings would increase
their labor supply more than those with higher labor income in the baseline economy. The OASI
beneﬁt adjustment factor would increase by 16.4%. By assumption, the removal of spousal and
survivors beneﬁts would allow the government to increase PIA (or workers beneﬁts) even if the
25Table 4: The Long-Run Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts in the Main Baseline














Capital stock (national wealth) 1.9 1.7 2.5
Labor supply 0.9 0.8 1.1
Total output (GDP) 1.2 1.1 1.5
Private consumption 0.9 1.0 1.5
Market work hours: men 0.3 0.0 0.4
Market work hours: women 4.6 4.3 4.9
Labor supply (efﬁciency units): men 0.1 0.0 0.3
Labor supply (efﬁciency units): women 2.2 2.0 2.4
Working hour ratio (women/men)1 3.3 3.2 3.4
Labor income ratio (women/men)1 1.4 1.4 1.4
Interest rate -1.6 -1.6 -2.2
Average wage rate 0.3 0.3 0.4
Welfare of age 21 households 0.3 0.8 0.6
Government consumption 1.5 0.0 0.0
Lump-sum transfers2 1.2 2.5 1.2
Marginal Income tax rates 0.0 0.0 -1.9
OASI payroll tax revenue 1.2 1.0 1.4
OASI beneﬁt adjustment 16.4 16.4 16.6
1 Changes in percentage points. In the baseline economy, the working hour ratio is 75.0%, and the labor
income ratio is 67.4%. 2 Change as a percentage of the baseline tax revenue.
payroll tax revenue is unchanged.
Because of the higher economic activity and tax revenue, the government would be able to in-
crease its consumption by 1.5% to keep its budget balanced.13 Since part of the increased resource
is consumed by the government, private consumption would increase only by 0.9%. The interest
rate would fall by 1.6% or 0.08 percentage points, and the average wage rate would rise 0.3%.
The average welfare gain of age 21 households in the consumption equivalent variation measure is
0.3% under this ﬁnancing assumption.
13Thegovernmentconsumptionandindividualincometaxrevenueareboth11.4%ofGDPinthebaselineeconomy.
26In Run 1(b), the government is assumed to distribute extra tax revenue to all households as
lump-sum transfers to balance the budget. The main difference from Run 1(a) is that Run 1(b)
would have an income effect due to the lump-sum transfers. Women’s market work hours would
increase by 4.3% and labor supply in efﬁciency units would increase by 2.0%. The increase rates
are both lower than those in Run 1(a). Under this assumption, total labor supply, capital stock, and
GDP would increase by 0.8%, 1.7%, and 1.1%, respectively. Individual tax revenue would increase
by 1.3%. This extra income tax revenue as well as the increased revenue from accidental bequests
would be distributed as lump-sum transfers. Private consumption would increase by 1.0%, which
is slightly higher than that in Run 1,(a). The changes in the interest rate and the wage rate would
be about the same levels as those in Run 1(a). The average welfare of age 21 households would
increase by 0.8%.
Run 1(c) assumes that the government would reduce the marginal income tax rates proportion-
ally to balance the government budget. The main difference from Run 1(b) is an additional sub-
stitution effect by the marginal tax rate cuts. Under this assumption, women’s market work hours
would increase most by 4.9%, and labor supply would increase by 2.4%. Total labor supply, cap-
ital stock, and GDP would increase by 1.1%, 2.5%, and 1.5%, respectively. Private consumption
would also increase by 1.5%. The increase rates of macroeconomic variables are all signiﬁcantly
higher than those in Runs 1(a) and 1(b). The government would be able to reduce the marginal
income tax rates proportionally by 1.9% to balance the budget. The interest rate would fall by
2.2%, and the wage rate would rise by 0.4%. The average welfare of age 21 households would
increase by 0.6%.
4.2 Long-Run Effects on Life-Cycle Behaviors
Figure 3 shows the long-run effects of removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts over the life
cycle. In each of the 8 charts, the solid black line shows the proﬁle of the main baseline economy,
the dashed blue line shows Run 1(a), the long-dashed red line shows Run 1(b), and the short-
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Figure 3: The Long-Run Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts over the Life Cycle
28Men’s market work hours are mildly hump-shaped. Women’s market work hours are also
hump-shaped but have a tendency to decline starting in their late 30s. As the husband and wife get
older, the wage disparity tends to increase, which makes the wife’s market work hours relatively
shorter. In addition, their average historical earnings approach to the ﬁnal values. If the wife’s
expected PIA was less than half of the husband’s expected PIA, the wife would tend to work less,
because the increased OASI payroll tax payment would not likely increase her OASI beneﬁts.
When spousal and survivors beneﬁts were removed, the increase in market work hours would
be larger for women than men, because women’s wage rates are on average lower than those of
men. Also, the increase in market work hours would be larger for those near the retirement age,
because workers are more certain about their own future PIA and OASI beneﬁts. Regarding private
consumption and wealth, the positive effects of the policy change tend to increase as workers get
older, and the increase rates are largest when the government reduces the marginal income tax rates
proportionally to balance the budget.
In the absence of spousal and survivors beneﬁts, the OASI beneﬁts would be on average higher
for retired households aged 78 or younger but lower for those aged 79 or older. In the baseline
economy, per capita OASI beneﬁts are on average increasing, because some widows (widowers)
switch their beneﬁts from their own beneﬁts to survivors beneﬁts when their spouses die. After
the policy change, as households get older, the number of widow(er)ed people would increase but
their OASI beneﬁts would be lower because of the removal of survivors beneﬁts.
Table 5 shows the long-run changes in market work hours of age 40 (i = 20) married house-
holds from the baseline economy. Rows, e1
1;:::;e5
1, are the husband’s wage levels at age 40, and
the columns, e1
2;:::;e5
2, are the wife’s wage levels. Since some people do not work outside the
home, the changes in market work hours of husbands and wives are calculated as a percentage of
average market hours of men and women, respectively, in the baseline economy.
Under all 3 government ﬁnancing assumptions, the husband’s market work hours would in-
crease signiﬁcantly when the state (the combination of e1 and e2) of the household was near (but









29Table 5: Long-run Changes in Hours of Market Work of Age Married 40 Households (changes as














1 -1.04 -0.06 6.93 3.94 0.00 12.97 -0.72 -1.37 0.09 1.82
Increasing e2
1 -0.60 -1.42 0.15 5.85 7.80 18.79 3.69 -1.05 -1.12 1.05
government e3
1 0.11 -1.12 -1.51 0.31 4.56 0.00 17.49 2.76 -0.70 -0.02
consumption e4
1 2.80 1.82 0.59 -0.41 -0.09 0.00 8.84 11.23 2.05 -0.62
e5
1 1.87 1.55 1.10 0.10 -0.33 0.00 0.00 18.65 6.59 -0.48
1(b) e1
1 -1.71 -0.54 6.55 3.74 0.00 11.74 -1.30 -1.73 -0.18 1.70
Increasing e2
1 -0.92 -1.73 -0.10 5.66 7.67 17.54 3.22 -1.35 -1.31 0.94
lump-sum e3
1 -0.07 -1.32 -1.67 0.17 4.45 0.00 17.11 2.50 -0.87 -0.12
transfers e4
1 2.67 1.70 0.49 -0.51 -0.19 0.00 8.59 11.02 1.91 -0.70
e5
1 1.80 1.48 1.03 0.04 -0.37 0.00 0.00 18.51 6.48 -0.55
1(c) e1
1 -1.05 -0.08 7.09 4.15 0.00 12.99 -0.72 -1.21 0.38 2.08
Reducing e2
1 -0.56 -1.35 0.29 6.12 8.14 19.16 3.86 -0.83 -0.83 1.31
income e3
1 0.28 -0.97 -1.33 0.55 4.89 0.00 17.89 3.08 -0.39 0.23
tax rates e4
1 2.99 2.00 0.76 -0.24 0.23 0.00 9.43 11.72 2.41 -0.38
e5
1 2.05 1.72 1.27 0.26 -0.19 0.00 0.00 19.18 7.04 -0.26
 Rows, e1
1;:::;e5
1, are the husband’s wage rates at age 40 (i = 20 ) from the lowest to the highest, and
columns, e1
2;:::;e5
2, are the corresponding wife’s wage rates.
(e3
1;e5
2). For households in these states, the husband’s market wage rate is lower relative to his
wife’s wage rate, and the husband expects to receive spousal and survivors beneﬁts when these
beneﬁts are available. Depending on the government ﬁnancing assumption and the state, the work-
ing hours of age 40 husbands in these states would increase on average by 3.7-7.8% as a percentage
of the average baseline market hours.
Similarly, the wife’s market work hours would increase most when the state of the household













these states, the wife’s market wage is signiﬁcantly lower relative to her husband’s. However, if
the wife’s wage rate was one of the lowest, e1
2, and her husband’s wage rate was high enough, e3
1
or higher, the wife would stay and work at home even after the removal of spousal and survivors
beneﬁts.
304.3 Transition Effects on Macro Economy and Welfare
Figure 4 shows the transition paths of a 40-year phased-in removal of spousal and survivors
beneﬁts from the current OASI program. In each of these 8 charts, the dashed blue line shows
the percent changes from the baseline economy in Run 1(a), the long-dashed red line shows the
percent changes in Run 1(b), and the short-dashed green line shows the percent changes in Run
1(c).
Women’s market work hours would jump up by 1.6-1.8% in the ﬁrst year of the policy change,
then the work hours would increase gradually to the long-run steady-state levels, which are 4.3-
4.9% higher than the baseline levels. The increase is largest when the marginal tax rates are
reduced and smallest when lump-sum transfers are introduced. Men’s work hours would decrease
by 0.08% or increase by 0.04% in the ﬁrst year, but the work hours would also increase gradually
to the long-run levels. Total labor supply in efﬁciency units would also increase by 0.2-0.3% in
the ﬁrst year. Total output and private consumption would show the same pattern as that of labor
supply, i.e., these jump in the ﬁrst year and increase gradually to the long-run steady-state levels.
The spousal and survivors beneﬁts are partially removed in a phased-in manner, starting from
age 60 households to age 22 households at the time of the policy change. Age 21 households
at the policy change are the ﬁrst (oldest) age cohort for whom spousal and survivors beneﬁts are
completely removed. Thus, it will take 80 years for these beneﬁts to be completely removed from
the model economy.
The bottom right chart shows the welfare change by age cohort. The horizontal axis is the age
of household cohort when the policy is changed (t = 1). The vertical line in the middle indicates
the youngest age cohort at the time of policy change. Households shown left of the vertical line
are current households aged between 21 and 100 at the time of the policy change, and those shown
right of the vertical line are future households aged 20 or younger.
The current elderly households aged 66 (i = 46) or older would be better off by the policy
change. Their OASI beneﬁt function is unaffected by the policy change but their OASI beneﬁts
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Figure 4: The Transition Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts
32interest income would also increase in the short run. The spousal and survivors beneﬁts of current
households aged 22 (i = 2) and 60 (i = 40) are partially removed, depending on their age in
period 1. Due to the phased-in policy change, the welfare gains/losses of these households would
be smaller/larger for younger households.
Whenadditionalgovernment taxrevenueareused forgovernmentconsumption(waste), house-
holds aged between 43 and -5 at the time of policy change would be on average worse off. If the
additional tax revenue were distributed to households as lump-sum transfers, all of the current and
future age cohorts would be on average better off. If the marginal income tax rates are reduced to
balance the government budget, the welfare effects are somewhere between those under the ﬁrst
two assumptions. Under all 3 ﬁnancing assumptions, the welfare gain of the age 21 households at
the time of policy change (t = 1) would be the smallest among all age cohorts.
Removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts could possibly make all of the current and future age
cohorts on average better off. However, this does not mean the policy change is Pareto improv-
ing in the heterogeneous-agent economy. Table 6 shows the welfare gains and losses of age 21
households in year 1 and in the long run by their initial wage levels.
Rows, e1
1;:::;e5
1, are the husband’s wage levels at age 21 (i = 1), and the columns, e1
2;:::;e5
2,
are the wife’s wage levels. Under all 3 ﬁnancing assumptions, the policy change—removing
spousal and survivors beneﬁts—would hurt households most when the husband’s wage is one of
the highest, e4
1 or e5
1, and the wife’s wage rate is the lowest, e1
2. The age 21 households of these
wage combinations in year 1 would be worse off by 3.00-3.25% in a consumption equivalence
measure. The age 21 households on the diagonal and somewhat above the diagonal tend to be
better off by this policy, because they are less likely receiving spousal and survivors beneﬁts after
retirement. Those households shown in the lower triangle tend to be worse off.
4.4 Individual Contributions of Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts
This section analyzes the long-run effects of spousal beneﬁts and survivors beneﬁts separately
and show the relative importance of these 2 beneﬁts. Table 7 shows the results.
33Table 6: Welfare Change of Age 21 Households in the Transition Path













1 -0.64 0.19 -0.14 -0.95 -1.42 0.50 1.07 0.51 -0.48 -1.16
Increasing e2
1 -1.67 -0.10 0.32 -0.01 -0.60 -0.85 0.60 0.90 0.44 -0.32
government e3
1 -2.62 -1.00 0.08 0.38 0.13 -2.03 -0.45 0.57 0.79 0.43
consumption e4
1 -3.25 -2.06 -0.63 0.21 0.40 -2.85 -1.66 -0.23 0.56 0.68
e5
1 -3.22 -2.45 -1.35 -0.25 0.29 -3.00 -2.21 -1.08 0.02 0.52
1(b) e1
1 -0.09 0.61 0.18 -0.70 -1.24 1.56 1.82 1.06 -0.09 -0.89
Increasing e2
1 -1.24 0.23 0.59 0.21 -0.44 -0.11 1.18 1.35 0.78 -0.08
lump-sum e3
1 -2.29 -0.73 0.30 0.55 0.27 -1.51 -0.01 0.93 1.07 0.63
transfers e4
1 -3.00 -1.85 -0.45 0.35 0.52 -2.47 -1.33 0.04 0.79 0.86
e5
1 -3.04 -2.29 -1.21 -0.13 0.38 -2.74 -1.97 -0.88 0.19 0.66
1(c) e1
1 -0.60 0.25 -0.06 -0.83 -1.26 0.66 1.24 0.72 -0.23 -0.83
Reducing e2
1 -1.61 -0.03 0.42 0.13 -0.42 -0.70 0.79 1.13 0.72 0.04
income e3
1 -2.54 -0.90 0.21 0.54 0.33 -1.86 -0.23 0.84 1.11 0.82
tax rates e4
1 -3.14 -1.93 -0.47 0.40 0.64 -2.62 -1.39 0.08 0.94 1.13
e5
1 -3.05 -2.27 -1.14 -0.01 0.56 -2.66 -1.85 -0.69 0.46 1.03
 The equivalence variation measure in consumption, %. Rows, e1
1;:::;e5
1, are the husband’s wage rates at
age 21 (i = 1 ) from the lowest to the highest, and columns, e1
2;:::;e5
2, are the corresponding wife’s wage
rates.
The second panel of Table 7 shows the effects of removing spousal beneﬁts only. Women’s
market work hours would increase by 2.1-2.4%. The increase rates are 49% of those when remov-
ing both beneﬁts. Interestingly, men’s work hours would increase by 0.2-0.4% and more than those
in the main experiment. Overall, total labor supply in efﬁciency units would increase by 0.5-0.7%,
capital stock would increase by 0.0-0.4%, and total output would increase by 0.3-0.6%. Removing
spousal beneﬁts would not increase household wealth very much. The welfare changes of age 21
households are on average very small. These households would be better off by at most 0.2% in
the long run.
The third panel of the same table shows the effect of removing surviors beneﬁts only. Women’s
market work hours would increase by 3.3-3.9%. Removing survivors beneﬁts account for 76-80%
of the increase in female working hours. We also see that the effect of removing these 2 types















1. Removing both spousal and survivors beneﬁts
Total output (GDP) 1.2 1.1 1.5
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.9 0.8 1.1
Market work hours: men 0.3 0.0 0.4
Market work hours: women 4.6 4.3 4.9
Welfare of age 21 households 0.3 0.8 0.6
1A. Removing spousal beneﬁts only
Total output (GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.6
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.6 0.5 0.7
Market work hours: men 0.3 0.2 0.4
Market work hours: women 2.3 2.1 2.4
Welfare of age 21 households -0.1 0.2 0.1
1B. Removing survivors beneﬁts only
Total output (GDP) 1.3 1.1 1.6
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.9 0.8 1.2
Market work hours: men 0.0 -0.3 0.1
Market work hours: women 3.6 3.3 3.9
Welfare of age 21 households 0.4 0.9 0.7
of beneﬁts are not additively separable. Men’s market work hours would decrease by 0.3% or
increase by 0.1%. Total labor supply would increase by 0.8-1.2%, capital stock would increase by
2.0-2.8%, and total output would increase by 1.1-1.6%. Surprisingly, the increase rates of these
macroeconomic variables are about the same or slightly higher than those when both beneﬁts are
removed. The welfare effects are also larger. The age 21 households would be better off on average
by 0.4-0.9%.
In the presence of survivors beneﬁts, removing spousal beneﬁts would increase labor supply
in efﬁciency units by 0.5-0.7% (Run 1A). However, in the absence of survivors beneﬁts, removing
spousal beneﬁts would possibly decrease labor supply by 0.1% (Runs 1B and 1), although total
working hours would still increase.
355 Policy Reform in the Alternative Baseline Economies
How would the effects of removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts differ depending on the
model assumptions? This section shows the policy effects in 3 alternative baseline economies:
the economy with a lower coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (Run 2), the economy with lower
persistence in wage shocks (Run 3), and the economy consisting of married couples with higher
wage correlation (Run 4). Table 8 shows the results of the same policy experiments in these 3
alternative economies as well as those in the main baseline economy.
The household’s preference assumed in this model is additively separable between husband
and wife as well as across time. Thus, when we reduce the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, ,
from 4.0 to 2.0, it will also change the intra-temporal (intra-household) elasticity of substitution of




(1 )(1 ) 1 = 1:08 from 0.61. The second panel (Run 2) of the table shows the results of
the policy experiments. With the higher intra-household elasticity of substitution, women’s market
work hours would increase by 5.1-5.6% from the new baseline economy. The increase rates are
0.7-0.8 percentage points higher than those in the main policy experiments. The increase rates in
GDP would be lower in this economy, and the welfare changes in age 21 households would also
be lower by 0.0-0.2 percentage points.
How about the effect of removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts in the economy with lower
wage persistence? If the transitory wage shocks are less persistent, households can predict their
future wage rates and OASI primary insurance amounts less accurately. Thus, the labor supply
reaction of households to the policy change will be smaller. The third panel (Run 3) shows the
results of the policy experiments. In the economy with less persistent wage shocks, women’s
market work hours would increase by 3.6-3.8% from the new baseline economy. The increase rates
in working hours are 1.0-1.1 percentage points higher than those in the main baseline economy.
Total output would increase by 1.0-1.4%. The increase rates are 0.1 percentage points lower.
However, the welfare effects are slightly larger compared to those in the main baseline economy.
The last panel (Run 4) of Table 8 shows the effects of removing spousal and survivors beneﬁts
36Table 8: The Long-Run Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Beneﬁts in the Alternative














1. Main baseline economy ( = 4:0,  = 0:98, corr(e1;1;e2;1) = 0:5)
Total output (GDP) 1.2 1.1 1.5
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.9 0.8 1.1
Market work hours: men 0.3 0.0 0.4
Market work hours: women 4.6 4.3 4.9
Welfare of age 21 households 0.3 0.8 0.6
2. Lower relative risk aversion ( = 2:0,  = 0:98, corr(e1;1;e2;1) = 0:5)
Total output (GDP) 1.0 0.9 1.3
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.9 0.8 1.0
Market work hours: men -0.1 -0.3 0.0
Market work hours: women 5.4 5.1 5.6
Welfare of age 21 households 0.3 0.6 0.5
3. Lower wage persistence ( = 4:0,  = 0:96, corr(e1;1;e2;1) = 0:5)
Total output (GDP) 1.1 1.0 1.4
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.8 0.7 1.0
Market work hours: men 0.2 0.0 0.4
Market work hours: women 3.6 3.3 3.8
Welfare of age 21 households 0.5 0.9 0.7
4. Higher wage correlation ( = 4:0,  = 0:98, corr(e1;1;e2;1) = 1:0)
Total output (GDP) 1.0 0.9 1.2
Labor supply (efﬁciency units) 0.8 0.6 0.9
Market work hours: men -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
Market work hours: women 4.3 4.1 4.6
Welfare of age 21 households 0.2 0.6 0.3
from the economy with stronger assortative matching. In this baseline economy, the husband’s
marketwagerateandthewife’swagerateatage21areperfectlycorrelated, i.e., thecombinationof




2), ..., or (e5
1;e5
2). However, for simplicity, the Markov transition
matrix is unchanged, thus the wage correlation decreases as married couples get older. Under this
assumption, the husband’s market wage and the wife’s wage are relatively close and fewer couples
would expect to receive spousal and survivors beneﬁts. By the removal of these beneﬁts, women’s
37market work hours would increase by 4.1-4.6% from the new baseline economy. The increase
rates are 0.2-0.3 percentage points lower than those in the main baseline economy. Total output
would increase by 0.9-1.2%. The welfare effects of the policy change in this baseline economy are
smaller compared to the main baseline economy.
Overall, the effects of the policy change on female labor supply would depend on the values
of several parameters assumed in the model economy. However, the effects on the overall macro
economy, as well as the well-being of households, would not be very different across the baseline
economies.
6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper extends a standard heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium OLG model
with idiosyncratic wage shocks by implementing the joint decision making of married couples
and the OASI spousal and survivors beneﬁt; calibrates the model to the 2009 U.S. economy; and
analyzes the possible labor supply, macroeconomic, and welfare effects of removing the survivors
and spousal beneﬁts. According to the numerical policy experiments of the model, the removal of
those beneﬁts would increase female market work hours signiﬁcantly by 4.3-4.9% in the long run
in the main baseline economy. The policy change would also increase overall labor supply, capital
stock, and total output of the economy. Most importantly, the model predicts that removing spousal
and survivors beneﬁts could improve the average welfare of all current and future age cohorts if
the additional tax revenue due to higher output was reimbursed to the households by lump-sum
transfers.
To make the model and the decision making of married couples as simple as possible, the
present paper assumes a unitary utility model of married households. That is, a husband and a
wife are fully altruistic to each other, and they choose their optimal consumption, working hours,
and saving jointly. Also, the paper does not consider the possibilities of divorce and remarrying,
because keeping the historical earnings of history of ex spouses would make the general equilib-
38rium model computationally intractable. However, the risk of separation would probably affect
the labor supply and saving decisions due to precautionary motives. Relaxing these assumptions
by introducing imperfect altruism, the strategic interactions between a husband and a wife, and
marriage and divorce decisions are left for possible future projects.
Through the policy experiments, the present paper has shown to what extent the removal of
spousal and survivors beneﬁts would likely increase the labor supply of married couples and im-
prove the welfare of heterogeneous households. The model developed in this paper would also
predict the effects of changes in ﬁscal policy and technology. The questions the model could
answer include how much female labor supply would increase when the wage disparity between
men and women is reduced; when private ﬁrms change their policy on health insurance coverage;
when the government subsidizes the cost of daycare services, and so on. An extended version of
the model would also help in designing the optimal beneﬁt schedule of the Social Security OASI
program.
39A Computational Algorithm
We solve the household’s optimization problem recursively from age i = I to age i = 1 by dis-
cretizingtheassetspace, A = [0;amax], into21nodes, ^ A = fa1;a2;:::;a21g, theaveragehistorical
earning space, B = [0;bmax], into 12 nodes each, ^ B = fb1;b2;:::;b12g, and the working ability














rs;ws;CG;s;trLS;s;'s;  P;s; s;WG;s
	1
s=t:
The household’s value function is shown as v(s;St;	t), and the factor prices and endogenous
governmentpolicyvariablesareshownasrs(Ss;	s), ws(Ss;	s),  s(Ss;	s), andsoon, fors  t.
However, it is impossible to solve the model of this form because the dimension of St is inﬁnite.
In this paper we avoid this curse of dimensionality problem by replacing (St;	t) with 
t. Since
we do not assume aggregate shocks in the model economy, the time series 
t is deterministic and
perfectly foreseeable, thus it will sufﬁce to ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of 
t to solve the model economy
for an equilibrium transition path.
In this appendix, we ﬁrst explain the algorithm to solve the household’s optimization problem
for each individual state node,
s = (i;a;b1;b2;e1;e2;m) 2 f1;2;:::;Ig  ^ A  ^ B
2  ^ E1;i  ^ E2;i  f0;1;2g;
taking 
t as given. For the numerical methods to solve a Kuhn-Tucker condition for a household’s
optimaldecision, seeJudd(1998)andMirandaandFackler(2002). Foramoregeneralalgorithmto
compute a steady-state equilibrium and an equilibrium transition path, see Nishiyama and Smetters
(2007).
40A.1 Algorithm to Solve the Household Problem
















subject to the constraints for the decision variables,
0 < c  cmax; l1 = 1   h1; l2 = 1   h2;
0 < l1  1 if m 6= 2; l1 = 1 if m = 2;
0 < l2  1 if m 6= 1; l2 = 1 if m = 1;
and the law of motion of the state variables,
s











cmax = (1 + rt)a + wte1h1 + wte2h2   I;t(rta + wte1h1 + wte2h2;m)















(i   1)b1 + min(wtejh1;#max)








(i   1)b2 + min(wtejh2;#max)

+ 1fiIR or m=1g b2:
Let the objective function be
f(c;l1;l2;s;








41Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution are
f1(c;l1;l2;s;




















































I;t(rta+wte1h1 +wte2h2;m) is the marginal income tax rate and P;k;t(wte1h1;wte2h2) is
the marginal payroll tax rate, corresponding to the kth argument. Equation (18) is the Euler equa-
tion, and equations (19) and (20) are the marginal rate of substitution conditions of consumption
for leisure.
With the inequality constraints for the decision variables, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the
household’s problem are expressed as the following nonlinear complementarity problem,
f1(c;l1;l2;s;
t) = 0 if 0 < c < cmax; > 0 if c = cmax;
f2(c;l1;l2;s;
t) = 0 if 0 < l1 < 1; > 0 if l1 = 1;
f3(c;l1;l2;s;
t) = 0 if 0 < l2 < 1; > 0 if l2 = 1;
which is expressed more compactly as the nonlinear system of equations,
(21) min
8
> > > > <
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= 0;
42where " is a small positive number. Following Miranda and Fackler (2002), we replace the
min(u;v) and max(u;v) operators with

 (u;v)  u + v  
p
u2 + v2; 
+(u;v)  u + v +
p
u2 + v2;
respectively, to make the above system of equations differentiable without altering the solutions.
We solve equation (21) for c(s;
t), l1(s;
t), and l2(s;
t) by using a Newton-type nonlinear
equation solver, NEQNF, of the IMSL Fortran Numerical Library.14
Once we obtain the optimal decision, we next calculate the value of the household with state s



































































where trSS;b1;t(i;b1;b2;m) and trSS;b2;t(i;b1;b2;m) are the marginal OASI beneﬁts corresponding
to b1 and b2, respectively. These marginal values are used to solve the optimization problem of age
i   1 in period t   1. The marginal beneﬁt functions in the baseline economy are obtained as
trSS;b1;t(i;b1;b2;m)







1f (i;b1)0:5 (i;b2)g b(i;b1) + 1f (i;b1)>2:0 (i;b2)g0:5 b(i;b1)

if m = 0;








1f (i;b2)0:5 (i;b1)g b(i;b2) + 1f (i;b2)>2:0 (i;b1)g0:5 b(i;b2)

if m = 0;
 t 1f (i;b2) (i;b1)g b(i;b2) if m = 1;2;
where  b(i;bj) is the marginal primary insurance amount (PIA) function,
 b(i;bj) = 1fiIRg(1 + )
40 i
1fbj<#1g0:90 + 1f#1bj<#2g0:32 + 1f#2bjg0:15
	




SS;b1;t(i;b1;b2;m) =  t  b(i;b1) if m = 0 or 1; = 0 if m = 2;
tr
1
SS;b2;t(i;b1;b2;m) =  t  b(i;b2) if m = 0 or 2; = 0 if m = 1:
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